Harmful competition in the insurance markets by De Feo, Giuseppe & Hindriks, Jean
Università degli Studi di Salerno 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE E STATISTICHE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Giuseppe De Feo – Jean Hindriks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harmful competition  
in the insurance markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 3.215 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Harmful competition
in the insurance markets
Giuseppe DE FEO1 and Jean HINDRIKS2
March 2010
Abstract
There is a general presumption that competition is a good
thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insur-
ance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general
worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is
that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive
constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types.
Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive
firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to
provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost
of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for
different distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general
performs (much) better than competition in terms of the real-
ization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium.
However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a re-
sult, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding
their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we address the critical question: how and how well do
competition on the markets handle the fundamental problems of infor-
mation. With imperfect information, market actions or choices convey
information and we know from earlier work (e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1976) that inefficiency and even existence problems can arise in com-
petitive markets because the slight change in the action of the informed
side of the market discretely changes beliefs of the other side of the
market. While information asymmetries inevitably arise, the extent to
which they do so and their consequences on the realization of the gains
from trade depend on the how the market is structured. This raises the
fundamental question of the interplay between two forms of market im-
perfections: imperfect information and imperfect competition. There is
no particular reason why competition should be better in the presence
of imperfect information. The simplest way by which this would not
be true is when the firm could exploit its market power to relax the
incentive constraints.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the efficiency of competition
on the insurance market in the presence of adverse selection. Using
the benchmark model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we contrast
the competitive equilibrium outcome with the monopoly equilibrium
outcome a` la Stiglitz (1977) and we compare their relative efficiency.
Following Rustichini et al. (1994), the (expected) efficiency of an equi-
librium is the fraction whose numerator is the expected gains from trade
across all traders in the equilibrium and whose denominator is the gains
from trade across all traders with full information. Using this crite-
rion we compare the monopoly outcome with one seller of insurance
contracts and many potential buyers with different risks against the
competitive outcome imposing zero profit on each contract that might
be offered in equilibrium. With a continuum of types the competitive
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equilibrium a` la Rothschild-Stiglitz does not exist, but since then vari-
ous alternative equilibrium concepts have been proposed, based either
on game theoretic refinements or on a Walrasian approach, that prove
the existence of competitive equilibria. Even though no general agree-
ment has been reached so far about the equilibrium concept, the general
intuition in the classical as well as more recent literature is that com-
petition typically results in the provision of a set of contracts that fully
separate types (Chiappori, 2006). In this paper we refer to the concept
of reactive equilibrium developed by Riley (1979) and Engers and Fer-
nandez (1987) for which the Pareto-dominant full separating zero-profit
outcome is the unique reactive equilibrium.1
The key finding is that the monopoly outcome, in general, is more
efficient than the competitive outcome (according to our expected ef-
ficiency criterion). The reason why monopoly performs better than
competition is that the monopolist can exploit its market power to offer
contracts that better satisfy the incentive constraints. More precisely,
the monopolist can offer contracts with implicit transfers across agent
types that can relax the incentive constraints and implement a larger
set of allocations. This is one of many examples of the interplay be-
tween market imperfections (see Jaffe and Stiglitz, 1990; Stiglitz, 1975).
The economy, in effect has to trade off between two different imper-
fections: imperfections of information or imperfections of competition,
with no particular reason that these imperfections will be balanced op-
timally. As we shall see, competition provides all risk types with an
insurance contract, but coverage is only partial. On the contrary, under
monopoly low risk types are forced to quit the market, but coverage
increases for the participating risk types. Even though monopoly per-
forms better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains
from trade, most of the surplus is retained by the firm. As a result,
there is always a majoritarian support for competitive markets among
individuals, notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than
monopoly.
Our paper continues a line of research begun by Stiglitz (1977), who
analyzed monopoly insurance markets, and compared the equilibrium
outcome with the (two-type) competitive outcome. Dahlby (1987) stud-
1see also Hellwig (1987), Bisin and Gottardi (2006), and Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2002) for other equilibrium concepts leading to the same outcome.
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ied the same issue in the same simplified two-type framework, but with-
out using the expected efficiency criterion to compare competition and
monopoly. His result is that monopoly may provide higher coverage
than competition but only when the proportion of low types is much
larger than high types, and so less important from the social view-
point since there are little gains from insurance. We claim that, while
the simplified framework with just two types is able to provide general
intuitions and qualitative results, it is no longer justified when quanti-
tative comparison is performed, as in the present paper. Furthermore,
it is fairly intuitive that this simplification skews the results in favour
of competition: by reducing the number of types screening becomes
less costly because fewer risk types have to be separated, while fewer
cross-subsidizing opportunities are available to monopoly. As a result,
using the more realistic framework of a continuum of types, monopoly
performs better than competition for almost any possible distribution
of risk types, except for the extreme cases in which the mode of the
distribution is on the highest risk.2
We perform this analysis in a non-expected utility framework us-
ing the dual theory approach to choice under risk developed by Yaari
(1987). It turns out that by using this specification of individual prefer-
ences we are able to provide a clear-cut comparison between monopoly
and competition. The dual theory has the property that utility is linear
in income, and risk aversion is expressed entirely by a transformation of
probabilities in which bad outcomes are given relatively higher weights
and good outcomes are given relatively lower weights. In our simple
two-state model the probability of bad outcome is weighted up by a
loading factor. It would be absurd to suggest that the dual theory pro-
vides a better model than the expected utility. The latter has obvious
appeal and has provided so many useful results in insurance theory.
Nonetheless, we feel there is some gain from studying the properties
of our simple non-expected utility model, even if only to derive some
clear insights on the efficiency of competition in the presence of adverse
selection.3
2For an illustration of the effect of the number of risk types on the outcome of the
comparison, see De Feo and Hindriks (2005) in which we analyze both the two-type
and the continuum-of-risk-type case.
3Indeed another distinctive property of insurance under dual theory is that the
demand of insurance cannot decrease with wealth. In contrast the expected util-
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
Section 3 contains the monopolist and competitive equilibria with a
continuum of types. In Section 4 simulation results are provided about
efficiency of competitive and monopoly markets. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
There are two possible states of the world: the “no accident” state
and the “accident” state. Individuals differ only by their probability
of accident, in which case they face a (fixed) damage d = 1. There
is no moral hazard since individuals cannot affect their probability of
accident which is fixed. There is a continuum of risk in the economy
distributed according to a cumulative probability function F (θ) with
density f(θ) > 0 on a closed and compact interval θ ∈ [θ, θ] (with
0 ≤ θ < θ < 1).
Adverse selection is introduced by assuming that individual risk is pri-
vate information, while the distribution of risks is common knowledge.
We model individuals’ risk preferences using Yaari (1987)’s dual theory
(DT). We first give a general description of this approach before apply-
ing it to our model. Let wealth X be a random variable distributed over
[x, x] according to the distribution function Ψ(x). Yaari’s representa-
tion of preferences is dual to the expected utility theory (EU) in the
sense that it is linear in wealth but non linear in probabilities. Prob-
abilities are transformed by a function Φ defined on the distribution
function Ψ(x).4 More precisely, DT preferences over X are given by
V (X) =
∫
x Φ′(Ψ(x)) dΨ(x)
where Φ(0) = 0, Φ(1) = 1 and Φ′(.) > 0. Φ′(.) are non-negative weights
adding up to one. Attitude towards risk is conveyed entirely by the
shape of Φ(.). Risk aversion is characterized by the concavity of Φ(.),
i.e. Φ′′(.) < 0. In this case, bad outcomes (with low Ψ(X)) receive
ity model makes the comparison between competition and monopoly difficult since
by charging a higher premium (relative to competition) for a given coverage the
monopoly increases the marginal willingness to pay for insurance.
4Alternatively this probability transformation function could be defined on the
decumulative distribution function 1−Ψ such as in Yaari (1987).
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higher weights than good outcomes (with high Ψ(X)). In other words,
V (X) is the certainty-equivalent of X computed as a weighted average
of outcomes in which bad outcomes are given high weight while good
outcomes are given low weight. Since V (X) is linear in wealth, this
approach separates attitude towards risk from attitude towards wealth.
We now apply DT to our simple two-state setting. For an individual
with wealth w facing a damage d = 1 with probability θ, an insurance
contract {δ, pi} with coverage rate δ ∈ [0, 1] and premium pi > 0 yields
the random variable X = (w − pi − (1 − δ), θ;w − pi, 1 − θ). We thus
define the utility associated to this insurance contract as
V (θ; δ, pi) = φ(θ)(w − pi − (1− δ)) + (1− φ(θ))(w − pi)
= w − pi − φ(θ)(1− δ)
where risk aversion is represented by φ(θ) > θ (and 1−φ(θ) < 1−θ).5 In
this paper, we further assume that φ(θ) = (1 + α)θ, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1−θ
θ
(the upper bound guaranteeing that φ(θ) ≤ 1 ∀θ). Making α inde-
pendent of w accords with our desire to disentangle risk aversion from
income and will greatly simplify the analysis. Using this formulation,
type-θ utility function from insurance contract {δ, pi} is
V (θ; δ, pi) = ω − pi − (1 + α)(1− δ)θ
where the utility loss from the residual risk (1 − δ)θ is inflated by the
markup factor 1+α. Now, comparing the utility with insurance against
the utility without insurance we can define the reservation premium for
each type. This is the premium p˜i(θ) that solves
V (θ; δ, pi) = V (θ; 0, 0)
ω − pi − (1 + α)(1− δ)θ = ω − (1 + α)θ
so that the reservation premium of type θ for coverage δ is:
p˜i(θ; δ) = (1 + α)δθ
5Note that in our model with a discrete random variable, risk aversion translates
into the transformation of the discrete density function φ(θ) > θ rather than the
concave transformation of the distribution function Φ′′(Ψ) < 0 as for continuous
random variable. In both cases risk aversion implies that bad outcomes are given
higher weight and good outcomes lower weight.
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Moreover the surplus of the agent is defined as the difference between
the reservation price and the price effectively paid:
S(θ; δ, pi) = p˜i(δ; θ)− pi
= (1 + α)δθ − pi
Assuming pi > 0, with free participation, those agents for which
p˜i(θ; δ) < pi will drop out of the market.
It is straightforward to see that the functions V and S have the
Single-Crossing property in the contract space-(δ, pi), because the mar-
ginal value of coverage is increasing in θ.
3 Monopoly versus competitive outcomes
In this section we study the equilibrium outcomes of monopoly and
competition in an insurance market with a continuum of risks.
The optimization problem of the monopolist is:
max
pi(θ),δ(θ)
∫ θ
θ
[pi (θ)− δ (θ) θ] dF (θ)
subject to
V (θ; δ (θ) , pi (θ)) ≥ V (θ; 0, 0) ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] (1)
V (θ; δ (θ) , pi (θ)) ≥ V
(
θ; δ
(
θ̂
)
, pi
(
θ̂
))
∀θ, θ̂ ∈ [θ, θ] (2)
where (1) is the set of participation constraints and (2) denotes the set
of incentive constraints. Analyzing the set (1) we can see that
V (θ; δ (θ) , pi (θ)) ≥ V (θ; 0, 0)
must be binding, for otherwise it would be possible to increase pi(θ)
∀θ > θ . This is the classical monopoly result of full rent extraction at
the bottom.
In the following Proposition the monopolist outcome is summarized.
Proposition 1 In a monopoly insurance market with a continuum of
risk, there exists
θ∗ =
1 + α
αh (θ∗)
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with h(.) the non-decreasing hazard rate function, such that the equilib-
rium contracts are
{δm (θ) , pim (θ)} = {0, 0} ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ∗]
{δm (θ) , pim (θ)} = {1, (1 + α) θ∗} ∀θ ∈ [θ∗, θ]
Proof. See Appendix.
Therefore the solution is characterized by a (pooling) contract that
offers full coverage to all θ ≥ θ∗ with a premium extracting the entire
surplus from type θ∗ and no insurance to all θ < θ∗. The equilibrium
payoff of type θ under monopoly is:
V (θ; δm (θ) , pim (θ)) = ω − (1 + α) θ ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ∗)
V (θ; δm (θ) , pim (θ)) = ω − (1 + α) θ∗ ∀θ ∈ [θ∗, θ] (3)
Monopolist (per capita) profit is
Πm = (1 + α) θ∗ [1− F (θ∗)]−
∫ θ
θ∗
θdF (θ) (4)
Rewriting h (θ∗) = f(θ
∗)
1−F (θ∗) the pivotal type solves
αθ∗f (θ∗) = (1 + α) (1− F (θ∗))
where the LHS is the revenue loss of an increase in θ∗ due to the non-
participation of pivotal type and the RHS is the revenue gain from
charging a higher price on all agents above the pivotal type θ∗.
The pooling contract performs cross-subsidization among types. In
fact, while θ∗-type individuals are extracted the whole surplus, higher
types are left with some rent and possibly pay a premium lower than
the fair price.
Shifting to the analysis of competition, it is well known that with
a continuum of types a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist. In
fact Riley (2001) showed the general non-existence of the Rothschild-
Stiglitz equilibrium. This existence problem can be circumvented by
resorting to the reactive equilibrium concept introduced by Riley (1979)
and developed further by Engers and Fernandez (1987). A reactive
7
equilibrium is a set of offers such that there is no profitable deviation
by any firm given that other firms can optimally react to this deviation
by offering new contracts. Engers and Fernandez (1987) provide general
conditions, for which the Pareto-dominant full-separating zero-profit set
of contracts is the unique reactive equilibrium outcome. It turns out
that those conditions hold true in our framework.6 The key element is
that firms are deterred to deviate from the full separating equilibrium
by the belief that other firms will react to “skim the cream” and make
such initial deviation unprofitable.
The Pareto-dominant fully separating zero-profit competitive equi-
librium solves
max
pi(.)≥0
δ(.)∈[0,1]
V (θ; δ (θ) , pi (θ)) ∀θ = [θ, θ]
subject to (1), (2) and the additional zero profit constraint:
pi (θ)− δ (θ) θ = 0 ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] (5)
The following Proposition summarizes the result due to Hindriks and
De Donder (2003).
Proposition 2 In a competitive insurance market with a continuum
of risk, the reactive equilibrium is characterized by the following set of
contracts:
{δc (θ) , pic (θ)} =
{(
θ/θ
) 1
α , θ
(
θ/θ
) 1
α
}
∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium payoff of type θ under competition is then:
V (θ; δc (θ) , pic (θ)) = ω − (1 + α) θ + αθ (θ/θ) 1α ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] (6)
6The conditions for existence and uniqueness of a reactive equilibrium in our
model are: (1) a continuous probability distribution F (θ); (2) the profit function of
insurance firms is continuous, bounded and non increasing in θ and δ; (3) V (θ; δ, pi) is
continuous on Θ×∆×Π where ∆ = [0, 1] and Π = [pi, p¯i] with pi= inf{p˜i(θ; δ) : θ ∈ Θ,
δ ∈ ∆} and p¯i = sup{p˜i(θ; δ) : θ ∈ Θ, δ ∈ ∆}, is strictly decreasing in pi and satisfies
the Single-Crossing property; (4) the contract space is a closed set ∆×Π.
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So, while in the monopoly every type θ ∈ [θ∗, θ] gets full insurance,
with competition only the highest-risk individuals obtain full coverage
and all the other individuals with lower risk obtain partial coverage. On
the other hand, every θ ∈ [θ, θ∗) gets no insurance with monopoly, while
they are provided at least with partial coverage in the competitive case.
Figure 1 compares equilibrium coverage with monopoly and competition
for a given distribution of risks.
Figure 1: Relative coverage rates under competition and monopoly.
The crucial feature of competitive equilibrium is that the set of im-
plementable contracts is smaller than under monopoly. Since each con-
tract must break even – by the constraint (5) – no cross-subsidization
can be performed among types. As a consequence, the distribution of
risks in the population does not influence the equilibrium outcome. In
fact, there is a unique solution to the problem of maximizing the utility
of each type given that every contract must break even and must be
incentive compatible. In Figure 2 the effect of a change in distribution
is depicted: the left panel shows a positively skewed distribution, while
the right panel shows a negatively skewed distribution. While the cov-
erage function under competition is unchanged, the level of θ∗ in the
left panel is lower than in the right panel. This means that when the
distribution of risks is positively skewed, the monopolist charges a lower
premium then when it is negatively skewed. The gain for the monop-
9
olist of including more types in the pooling exceeds the profit loss due
to the reduction in premium.
Figure 2: The effect of different distributions on coverage and partici-
pation under competition and monopoly.
There is a clear trade-off between participation and coverage in the
insurance markets under monopoly and competition. Monopoly, in fact,
ensures full coverage to the individuals that buy insurance contracts,
but this is obtained at the expenses of low risk types that do not partici-
pate. Under competition, on the other hand, each individual is provided
with an insurance contract, but coverage is only partial. As a conse-
quence, there is no clear analytical result when we compare monopoly
and competition. We need to perform numerical simulations on the
distribution of individuals and the next Section provides the results.
4 Relative efficiency
In this section we perform some numerical simulations using Beta dis-
tribution of risks with non-decreasing hazard rate.
We have seen that the risk distribution affects the monopoly outcome
by changing the critical level θ∗, while it does not affect the competition
equilibrium outcome.
The effect of changing the distribution on the equilibrium monopoly
participation rate is illustrated in Table 1.7 In this Table a Beta distri-
bution (a, b) is used to show that the participation rate increases with
the concentration of the distribution (i.e., simultaneous increase in a
and b). Moreover, participation is higher with negatively skewed dis-
tributions (i.e., a − b > 0). The intuition of the latter result is simple.
7Table 1 and the following tables are built assuming α = 1/3, θ = 0 and θ = 0.7.
10
ba 1 2 3 5 10
1 20.00 11.11 7.87 5.29 3.46
2 33.33 22.09 17.05 12.41 8.59
3 42.86 31.35 25.54 19.64 14.22
5 55.56 45.19 39.20 32.32 24.98
10 71.43 64.24 59.49 53.20 44.98
Table 1: Participation rate under monopoly for various distributions
over risk Beta(a,b).
Consider a small decrease in the skewness of the distribution such that
the effect on f (θ∗) (a second order effect) is negligible. The first or-
der effect of this change is an increase in 1 − F (θ∗). Then, at θ∗ the
monopoly is no longer in equilibrium since
θ∗h (θ∗) <
1 + α
α
and the firm can increase its profits by increasing the premium charged
and, as a consequence, the risk level of the critical type. At the new
equilibrium
θ∗∗h (θ∗∗) =
1 + α
α
where θ∗∗ > θ∗, that implies h (θ∗∗) < h (θ∗). Given that the effect on
f (θ∗) is negligible, it follows that the participation rate has increased;
i.e., [1− F (θ∗∗)] > [1− F (θ∗)].
Following Rustichini et al. (1994) we measure efficiency in terms of
total surplus generated in the market as a fraction of the first best (full
information) surplus.
Table 2 shows the total surplus realized under competition and mono-
poly as a percentage of the total surplus under full information. Fixing
the degree of risk aversion and the spread of risks we can compare
competition and monopoly for different Beta distributions. The key
result is that except for the uniform distribution (a = b = 1) and
distributions for which the highest risk is the mode (b = 1), monopoly
performs better than competition.
The difference in performance increases with the concentration and
with the skewness (i.e., as b− a increases). The level of the parameters
11
b
1 2 3 5
a mon comp mon comp mon comp mon comp
1 36.00 40.00 25.92 20.00 21.37 11.43 17.05 4.76
2 45.57 50.00 35.51 28.57 30.43 17.86 25.20 8.33
3 52.58 57.14 43.06 35.71 37.90 23.81 32.22 12.12
5 62.21 66.67 54.01 46.67 49.15 33.94 43.34 19.58
10 74.79 78.57 69.08 62.86 65.33 51.07 60.34 35.05
Table 2: Surplus under monopoly and competition as a percentage of
the First Best surplus for various distributions over risk Beta(a,b).
may marginally affect the ranking and only in favor of monopoly. An
increase in the risk aversion increases the surplus both under competi-
tion and monopoly. Under competition the coverage function δc (θ) =(
θ/θ
)1/α
is increasing in α; the intuition is that separation becomes
easier and a lower difference in coverage suffices.
Under monopoly, in the equilibrium condition
θ∗h (θ∗) =
1 + α
α
the RHS is decreasing in α and so the equilibrium entails a lower θ∗ and
a higher participation rate. The intuition is that the willingness to pay
increases with the risk aversion and the increase in profit of including
lower-risk types in the pool is larger than the loss of reducing slightly
the premium.
It is possible to show with simulations that the ranking between
monopoly and competition is not affected by any value of α ∈ (0, 1).8
On the contrary, it is possible to show that a change in the spread
of risks
[
θ, θ
]
may alter the ranking in favor of monopoly. Consider, for
example, the uniform distribution case. In this case h (θ) = 1
θ−θ and
the equilibrium condition becomes:
θ∗
θ − θ∗ =
1 + α
α
8It is worth recalling that α > 1 means that φ (θ) > 2θ.
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So, if θ ≥ 1+α1+2αθ, then θ∗ ≡ θ and all the individuals are provided with
full insurance under monopoly – the first best solution; this result is
not possible under competition.
4.1 Distribution and political support
It is worth emphasizing that both monopoly and competition do not im-
plement neither constrained Pareto-optimal nor second-best allocations
in terms of total surplus. On the one hand, implementable allocations
under competition are reduced by the additional set of zero-profit con-
straints; on the other hand, monopolist firm maximizes profits rather
than consumers or total surplus. A Pareto-dominant allocation with re-
spect to the monopolist outcome is simply the allocation that increases
the pool of types buying full insurance up to the point in which the
premium paid is equal to the average cost; the allocation obviously in-
crease total surplus, too. A Pareto-dominant allocation with respect to
the competitive outcome is the one that pools the closest-to-the-highest
risk types with the highest risk type in a full coverage contract up to
the point in which the lowest risk in the pool is indifferent between the
new pooling contract and the old competitive equilibrium contract in-
tended for him, and leaves the same competitive equilibrium contracts
to all the other (lower) risk types.9 This new allocation also increases
the total surplus generated on the market.
Surplus obtained by individuals under monopoly and competition
can be computed from equations (3) and (6):
S (θ; δm (θ) , pim (θ)) = 0 ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ∗]
= (1 + α) (θ − θ∗) ∀θ ∈ (θ∗, θ]
S (θ; δc (θ) , pic (θ)) = αθ
(
θ/θ
) 1
α ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ]
In Figure 3 the benefit from insurance for each type under monopoly
and competition is depicted. It is easy to see that most types are better
off under competition than monopoly.
9This allocation is always feasible; Riley (2001) shows how reducing the premium
of the full coverage contract (and so attracting more risk types) is always profitable
for any continuous distribution.
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Figure 3: Benefit from insurance of the types under competition and
monopoly.
In fact, even though monopoly is in general more efficient in terms
of total surplus, most of the gains from trade are retained by the firm.
In Table 3 we show that, whatever is the distribution, most individuals
prefer competition to monopoly. So, there is always a majoritarian
support for competitive insurance markets even when it is less efficient.
b
a 1 2 3 5 10
1 0 6.62 6.17 4.80 3.38
2 0 10.69 12.35 10.87 8.30
3 0 10.84 16.87 16.56 13.56
5 0 0 20.05 24.98 23.14
10 0 0 0 29.19 37.94
Table 3: Percentage of the population that prefers monopoly to com-
petition for various distributions over risk Beta(a,b).
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5 Conclusions
Using the benchmark model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), we con-
trast the competitive equilibrium outcome with the monopoly equilib-
rium outcome a` la Stiglitz (1977) and we compare their relative effi-
ciency. The main change is that we adopt the dual theory of risk so
that the comparison comes out neatly when dealing with a continuum
of types. The dual theory has the property that utility is linear in
income, and risk aversion is expressed entirely by a transformation of
probabilities in which bad outcomes are given relatively higher weights
and good outcomes are given relatively lower weights.
Our main finding is that competition is bad and that the monopoly
outcome in general is more efficient than the competitive outcome (ac-
cording to our expected efficiency criterion defined as the fraction of the
total surplus that is realized by the market). The reason why monopoly
performs better than competition is that the monopolists can exploit
its market power to relax the incentive constraints. This is one of many
examples of the interplay between market imperfections. The economy,
in effect has to trade off between two different imperfections: imperfec-
tions of information or imperfections of competition, with no particular
reason that these imperfections will be balanced optimally.
Even though monopoly performs better than competition in terms of
the realization of the gains from trade, most of the surplus is retained
by the firm. As a result, most individuals always prefer competitive
markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than
monopoly.
We expect our result about the inefficiency of competition in insur-
ance markets with adverse selection to carry over on other markets with
adverse selection like the capital market or the job market.
There is a final remark about the use of the dual theory of risk. With
this specification there is no income effect on the demand of insurance.
In contrast, the expected utility approach will raise the demand for
insurance in the monopoly market relative to the competitive market
if the absolute risk aversion is decreasing. This is because monopoly
price is higher than competitive price which reduces income and thus
raises the marginal willingness to pay for insurance. It is then expected
that moving to the expect utility will further increase the amount of
insurance in the monopoly market relative to the competitive market,
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thereby reinforcing our conclusion about the inefficiency of competition.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Because the unique binding IR constraint
is for the lowest type:
V (θ; δ (θ) , pi (θ)) = V (θ; 0, 0)
The set of incentive constraints implies that
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ∈[θ,θ]
V (θ; δ(θˆ), pi(θˆ)) ∀ θ, θˆ ∈ [θ, θ]
the first order condition for the type θ is:
∂V (θ; δ(θˆ), pi(θˆ))
∂θˆ
=
∂
∂θˆ
[ω − (1 + α)(1− δ(θˆ))θ − pi(θˆ)]
= (1 + α)δ′(θˆ)θ − pi′(θˆ) = 0
which evaluated at θˆ = θ gives the local incentive compatibility condi-
tions (LIC)
(1 + α)δ′(θ)θ − pi′(θ) = 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ, θ] (7)
Moreover, the necessary LIC is also sufficient condition when the utility
function satisfies the increasing differences property,
∂2V (θ; δ(θˆ), pi(θˆ))
∂θˆ∂θ
= (1 + α)δ′(θˆ) ≥ 0
which requires the coverage to be monotonically increasing δ′(θ) ≥ 0.
Define the value function of the maximization problem evaluated at
the truth-telling equilibrium:
U(θ) = V (θ; δ(θ), pi(θ)) = ω − (1 + α)(1− δ(θ))θ − pi(θ)
differentiating with respect to θ
U ′(θ) = −(1 + α)(1− δ(θ)) + (1 + α)δ′(θ)θ − pi′(θ)
= −(1 + α)(1− δ(θ)) < 0 (8)
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where the second equality follows from (7).
Using these results we can rewrite the maximization programme of
the monopolist as follows:
max
pi(θ),δ(θ)
∫ θ
θ
[pi(θ)− δ(θ)θ]dF (θ)
subject to
δ′(θ) ≥ 0
(1 + α)δ′(θ)θ − pi′(θ) = 0
V (θ; δ(θ);pi(θ)) ≥ V (θ; 0, 0)
Ignoring for the moment the monotonicity constraint which will be ver-
ified later, we can rewrite the objective function after substituting the
constraints in it. From the definition of the value function
pi(θ) = ω − (1 + α)(1− δ(θ))θ − U(θ) (9)
and by equation 8
U(θ) = U(θ) +
∫ θ
θ
−(1 + α)(1− δ(s))ds
By using the binding constraint for the low type,
= ω − (1 + α)θ − (1 + α)(θ − θ) +
∫ θ
θ
(1 + α)δ(s)ds
= ω − (1 + α)θ +
∫ θ
θ
(1 + α)δ(s)ds (10)
Substituting this expression into (9):
pi(θ) = ω − (1 + α)(1− δ(θ))θ − ω + (1 + α)θ −
∫ θ
θ
(1 + α)δ(s)ds
= (1 + α)δ(θ)θ −
∫ θ
θ
(1 + α)δ(s)ds (11)
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This expression for the insurance premium captures the incentive and
participation constraints. Plugging this premium in the objective func-
tion we get the reduced problem:
max
δ(θ)
∫ θ
θ
[
(1 + α)δ(θ)θ − δ(θ)θ −
∫ θ
θ
(1 + α)δ(s)ds
]
dF (θ)
The second term is the aggregate informational rent which integrating
by parts is given by
∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(1+α)δ(s)dsdF (θ) =
∣∣∣∣∫ θ
θ
(1 + α)δ(s)dsF (θ)
∣∣∣∣θ
θ
−
∫ θ
θ
(1+α)δ(θ)F (θ)dθ
with ∫ θ
θ
(1 + α)δ(s)ds = 0
F (θ) = 0
F (θ) = 1
Hence:∫ θ
θ
∫ θ
θ
(1 + α)δ(s)dsdF (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
(1 + α)δ(θ)dθ −
∫ θ
θ
(1 + α)δ(θ)F (θ)dθ
=
∫ θ
θ
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
(1 + α)δ(θ)dF (θ)
Plugging the solution for the informational rent into the objective func-
tion
max
δ(θ)∈[0,1]
∫ θ
θ
[
αδ (θ) θ − 1− F (θ)
f (θ)
(1 + α) δ (θ)
]
dF (θ)
Let h(θ) = f(θ)1−F (θ) be the hazard rate, then the monopoly programme
is
max
δ(θ)∈[0,1]
∫ θ
θ
[
αδ (θ) θ − (1 + α)
h (θ)
δ (θ)
]
dF (θ)
Because the objective is maximized when the argument of the integral
is maximized ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] the result of Proposition 4 is obtained.
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It remains to check the monotonicity constraint. To be verified, it
requires that
∂2
∂δ(θ)∂θ
[
αδ (θ) θ − (1 + α)
h (θ)
δ (θ)
]
≥ 0
This condition can be expressed in terms of the hazard rate
h′(θ)
h2(θ)
≥ − α
1 + α
A sufficient condition is that the hazard rate is non-decreasing in the
interval [θ, θ] which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. From the zero profit conditions (5) it
follows that the participation constraints of all the types (1) are not
binding and can be disregarded.
Following the incentive compatibility approach of Mailath (1987) the
set (2) can be rewritten as the maximization programme of agents
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ∈[θ,θ]
V (θ; δ(θˆ), pi(θˆ)) ∀ θ, θˆ ∈ [θ, θ]
By the zero profit condition (5), every agent with risk θ is facing ac-
tuarially fair premium: pi(θ) = δ(θ)θ. This can be incorporated in the
first order condition for the type θ that is:
∂V (θ; δ(θˆ), pi(θˆ))
∂θˆ
=
∂
∂θˆ
[ω − (1 + α)(1− δ(θˆ))θ − δ(θˆ)θˆ]
= (1 + α)δ′(θˆ)θ − δ′(θˆ)θˆ − δ(θˆ) = 0
which evaluated at θˆ = θ gives the local incentive compatibility condi-
tion
(1 + α)δ′(θ)θ − δ′(θ)θ − δ(θ) = αδ′(θ)θ − δ(θ) = 0 (12)
This first order condition is also sufficient when the second order con-
dition is respected, i.e.
∂2V (θ; δ(θˆ), pi(θˆ))
∂θˆ∂θ
= (1 + α)δ′(θˆ) ≥ 0
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that requires the coverage function to be monotonically increasing.
Hence the equilibrium coverage rate function δ(θ) is the solution to
the following differential equation, coming from the first order condi-
tion (12),
δ′(θ)
δ(θ)
=
1
αθ
∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] (13)
Fortunately, the differential equation can be solved directly; the primi-
tive of the LHS is ∫
δ′(θ)
δ(θ)
dθ = log δ(θ) + c1
and the for the RHS it is∫
1
αθ
dθ = log θ
1
α + c2
So, taking exponential on both sides
δ(θ) = θ
1
αk
By using the usual no distortion at the top argument we have a terminal
condition, δ(θ) = 1, by which
θ
1
αk = 1 =⇒ k =
(
1
θ
) 1α
So, the solution is the following coverage function
δc (θ) =
(
θ/θ
) 1
α ∈ [0, 1] ∀ θ ∈ [θ, θ]
By the zero profit condition the premium function is
pic (θ) = δc (θ) θ =
(
θ1+α
θ
) 1
α
∀ θ ∈ [θ, θ]
Since the coverage function is increasing in θ, the second order condition
is respected, which completes the proof.10
10In fact, δc′ (θ) = 1
α
(
θ1−α
θ
) 1
α ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ [θ, θ].
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